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1. INTRODUCTION
Across the globe, the economic crisis has amplified 
the significance of good corporate governance (CG) 
and increased regulation as complementary to the 
“over-liberated” freedom of modern capitalism 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). On the other side, 
classic cases of corporate fraud such as WorldCom, 
Enron, and Arthur Andersen, one of the top audit 
firms, have been ascribed to weak CG practices 
(Ntim & Danbolt, 2012) and triggered the need for 
stringent CG mechanisms. However, in most 
comparative CG research, it is assumed that national 
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Corporate governance (CG) is often split among rule and principle-
based methods to regulation in distinctive institutional contexts. 
Relying on an alternative theoretical framework (i.e. institutional 
theory), rather than the dominant agency theory, this study 
conceptualizes corporate governance practices and structures as 
institutionally resolute and directed and explores the key institutional 
determinants of good CG practices in an emerging economy. Drawing 
on qualitative and quantitative methods, this study conducted semi-
structured interviews from eight CG professionals, followed by a survey 
questionnaire (N=105) from PSX listed firms. The study explores the 
extent to which certain underlying formal and informal institutional 
determinants, such as the auditing, political, legal, board, shareholders 
awareness, voting, culture, and values play a determining role in 
corporate governance. Using exploratory factor analysis, this study 
identified five major barriers, i.e. firm-level barriers, external barriers, 
social barriers, education and training barriers and legal barriers which 
restrain good CG practices in Pakistan. In addition, this study identified 
four major drivers, i.e. internal drivers, regulatory drivers, motivational 
drivers and collaborative drivers which can promote good CG practices 
in Pakistan. The findings of multiple hierarchical regression analysis 
revealed that the CGI score has a significant positive relationship with 
both return on assets and return on equity. This study emphasizes the 
necessity to revisit the foundation of institutional and agency theories 
in the environment of developing countries. 
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institutions determine firm-level CG practices 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Mallin (2007) and 
Iturriaga (2009) argued that CG codes have gained 
popularity due to these mega-corporate failures and 
evolving investors‟ awareness. Consequently, CG 
regulations and reforms have become a primacy 
agenda for market regulators and governments 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Agency theory 
was prominent in fostering contemporary CG 
discussions. Nonetheless, researchers debated that 
CG is shaped by institutional factors, especially, in 
the international context (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 
2010; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Williamson, 
1989). Thus, the institutionalism based CG literature 
has advanced considerations beyond the boards of 
directors (BoDs) to the legal structure and financial 
markets, and to the broader cultural understanding 
about the role of the corporation in modern society 
(Davis, 2005).  
Researchers acknowledged that divergence in 
global CG practices is due to divergence in 
institutional environments across countries (Judge, 
Douglas, & Kutan, 2008). This has led to a growing 
appreciation of the institutional effects on CG in 
developed countries (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & 
Nakajima, 2013; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, 
2005; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2007; 
Sauerwald & Peng, 2013), conversely, a comparative 
gap still exists in the CG literature for developing 
countries that are usually characterized by weak 
institutions (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011). 
Specifically, in the socio-economic environment of 
Asian developing countries, the corporate context is 
critically exaggerated through informal social 
relations (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008) which are 
highly socially valued. The governance structure of 
any country can be determined by its de facto 
realities of the corporate environment (Khanna, 
Kogan, & Palepu, 2006), firms‟ articles of association 
and the legal and regulatory framework.  
In this debate, the questions arise as to how the 
institutional environment affects CG practices and 
how local and international firms can, by 
themselves; promote good CG in weak institutional 
settings. This study addresses these questions and 
pursues comprehending how CG can be regulated 
and reformed to improve good CG practices in 
Pakistan? This study also identifies the barriers to 
good CG practices and, finally, examines the nexus 
between CG compliance (CGI) score and firm 
performance on a sample of Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (PSX) listed firms.  
In Pakistan, the detailed provisions, regarding 
CG mechanisms, are provided by the Code of 
Corporate Governance (CCG) issued by the Security 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 
March 2002. However, in 2012, the SECP carried out 
a reform of CCG 2002 and made most of the 
provisions mandatory for the listed companies. All 
the listed companies need to comply with CCG 2012 
to remain listed on PSX, consequently, many firms 
delisted from PSX. Besides all these efforts by SECP, 
the problem still exists regarding true compliance 
with the corporate governance code.1 After the 
reform in CCG 2012, the CCG has many mandatory 
provisions related to auditing, board structure, and 
disclosure for listed companies but there are still 
some voluntary provisions (SECP CCG, 2012). These 
                                                          
1 SECP introduced a new code of corporate governance in 2017, 
implemented from 2018, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
provisions challenge the discretionary power of the 
state and families and have great impact on a 
company‟s management. Therefore, they are 
unwilling to regard the CG code in its true spirit and 
compliance with the CCG is in form not in 
substance. A recent study conducted by Khan (2014) 
documented that tick box practice is very common 
among PSX listed firms and CG provisions are not 
complied with in the true sense. He also documented 
that senior officers of SECP confirmed that the CCG 
does not comply in the true sense as many public 
listed firms are family-owned (FOBs) in Pakistan. 
Therefore, in such firms, family members are elected 
as executive and non-executive directors. 
Additionally, these firms also appoint family 
members as independent directors with a few 
shares. Many FOBs have appointed their children as 
independent directors with a few shares to fulfill the 
requirement of the CCG 2012. He further concluded 
that “law in books” is not enough; it should be 
implemented to be considered as “law in action”. 
Similarly, Samza (2016) conducted a study in 
Pakistan to identify weaknesses of CG and explored 
opportunities for its improvement. She documented 
that many of the CCG provisions overlap with the 
Companies‟ Ordinance 1984 which is problematic. 
She further documented that the SECP and the 
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) 
should have a strategy to increase awareness about 
the benefits of adopting corporate governance. 
Yakasai (2001) and Ahunwan (2002) argued 
that the weak institutional context makes self-
regulatory initiatives impractical and corporate law 
enforcements naive. Hence, it is noticed that CG in 
developing countries faces several challenges 
(Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; Okpara, 2011; Reed, 
2002) including weak institutional frameworks 
(Adegbite et al., 2013; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012; 
Aguilera, 2005; Arslan & Abidin, 2019a), inefficient 
adoption of Anglo-American models (Kraakman & 
Hansmann, 2017; West, 2006), various deviations in 
firm-level governance (Klapper & Love, 2004; Okike, 
Adegbite, Nakpodia, & Adegbite, 2015) and principal-
principal concerns (Chen & Young, 2010; Su, Xu, & 
Phan, 2008; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 
2008). Similarly, Rwegasira (2000) debated that the 
institutional environment needs to be accounted for 
before and during the establishment of CG systems 
in developing countries. Okpara (2011) reinforced 
this argument and documented that CG challenges 
during its development could be expounded by the 
quality of the underlying institutional environment 
in the developing economies. In addition, 
researchers debated that board effectiveness 
depends on the firm‟s institutional environment 
(Gillan, 2006; Mangena, Tauringana, & Chamisa, 
2012); consequently, governance theories may need 
reforms or improvement in order to achieve a robust 
CG system. According to a report of the World Bank 
(2013), emerging market firms are playing a 
compelling part in reforming the global 
industrialisation process. Therefore, it is critical to 
establish effective CG mechanisms in these emerging 
economies because the prevalence of a weak CG 
system in these economies could have global 
implications. This study used the exploratory 
sequential research design and conducted the semi-
structured focus group interviews from eight 
respondents, followed by survey questionnaire from 
105 respondents of PSX listed firms. Drawing 
substantially on agency and institutional theories, 
this study, therefore, explicitly contributes to CG 
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literature in developing countries (Douglass, 1990; 
Scott, 2013; Zucker, 1987), especially in Pakistan. 
The study contributes to and encompasses the 
extent of institutional theory. The institutional 
theory has already identified the capacity of 
institutions to control behaviour of economic agents 
(Douglass, 1990; Scott, 2013) and has received 
evolving interest among scholars regarding its role 
in the evaluation of CG issues (Aguilera, 2005; Roe, 
2003). In addition, emerging literature affirmed that 
CG is persuaded by the vigour of institutional 
factors (Adegbite et al., 2013; Nakpodia, Shrives, & 
Sorour, 2018) in the business environment (Adegbite 
& Nakajima, 2011; Judge et al., 2008). Consequently, 
various categorizations such as legal, political and 
economic institutions (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; 
Okike et al., 2015) and sociological, historical and 
political institutionalism (Leicht & Jenkins, 2009), 
have been widely espoused in discussing the 
institutional environment and theory of CG 
(Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011, 2012). Notwithstanding 
these developments, this study was inspired to 
explore the capacity and robustness of the key 
institutional determinants and categorizations in 
order to expound CG practices in an emerging 
country such as Pakistan. In addition, this interest 
was inspired by the positions of some scholars 
(Fukuyama, 2006; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Przeworski, 2004) who 
question the applicability of institutions and 
institutional determinants. Scholars further 
postulated that it is the conditions that reinforce 
institutions, more than institutions affecting the CG 
practices and direction. The findings of this study 
(see Section 5) are in agreement with the views and 
support the applicability of institutions (Nakpodia, 
2017; Owoye & Bissessar, 2012; Sorour & Howell, 
2012), confirming their significance in adding to 
existing knowledge concerning the institutional 
theory of CG. It is noted that CG literature is limited 
in developing countries (Armitage, Hou, Sarkar, & 
Talaulicar, 2017; Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; 
De Nicolò, Laeven, & Ueda, 2008; Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007), hence, this study adds to the 
existing CG literature. Majority of CG studies, in 
emerging countries particularly in Pakistan, are 
exaggerated on the empirical and limited to 
secondary data. Therefore, this study contributes to 
CG literature by employing both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Due to the scarcity of CG 
studies in developing countries, it is challenging for 
multiple national corporations to comprehend the 
challenges of CG in these countries. Thus, a key 
motivation of this study is to address these 
challenges among developing countries and 
contribute to existing knowledge.  
The study has implications for and contributes 
to practice. In Pakistan, the foremost corporate 
governance regulation was introduced in 2002 by 
SECP, a principal based regulatory approach, and 
was recently reformed in 2012, in which SECP made 
provisions mandatory for listed firms. However, 
many scholars and practitioners have identified 
concerns and challenges regarding CG practices in 
Pakistan (Arslan, 2019; Arslan & Abidin, 2019b; 
Fatima, Mortimer, & Bilal, 2018; Khan, 2014; Samza, 
2016). This antecedent assessment was supported 
by participants of this study, consequently, need 
arises to introduce a regulatory approach that could 
promote good CG system in Pakistan. Section 5 
highlighted the CG challenges which are faced in the 
country. In Pakistan, the corporate governance code 
was introduced with a principles-based approach 
(comply or explain), however, SECP has made it 
mandatory in the recent reform in 2012. Indeed, it 
was apparent that most companies are not 
complying with corporate governance practices in a 
true spirit and are performing tick box practice. It 
indicates that a rule-based approach is also not 
helpful in the context of Pakistan while a principles-
driven approach is effective in presence of robust 
institutional elements and free information flow 
(Arjoon, 2005; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Therefore, it 
proposes the need for integration of the elements of 
rules-based and principles-based approaches in 
Pakistan. Both approaches can adequately 
strengthen each other to spawn optimum outcomes 
of CG system (Arjoon, 2005; Sama & Shoaf, 2005). 
The combination of both will help in boosting the 
CG system in Pakistan. Section 2 presents the 
literature review while Section 3 presents the 
detailed methodology of the paper. The findings of 
the study are presented in Section 4 while Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The East Asian crisis has injected fresh fuel into the 
promulgation of various CG codes in this part of the 
world. Nevertheless, low compliance and loose CG 
rules are blamed as the causes of the crisis in 
1997-1998 (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). On the other 
side of the world, the failure of big companies such 
as Enron and WorldCom has been ascribed to weak 
CG practices (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). Mallin (2007) 
and Iturriaga (2009) argued that globalization, 
corporate collapses, and increased investors‟ 
awareness have prompted the diffusion and 
worldwide popularity of CG practices. Hence, around 
the globe, evolving attention has made CG 
regulations and reforms a primacy topic for market 
regulators and governments. Similarly, Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) documented that corporate 
governance has received ample consideration from 
academics and policymakers due to the implications 
of CG reforms, specifically in the socio-economic 
environment of Asian developing countries where 
the corporate environment is affected by highly 
valued informal social relations (Arslan, 2019; 
Arslan & Roudaki, 2017; Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 
2008). Most of the existing CG literature revolves 
around larger companies in developed countries; 
however, it is still emerging in developing countries. 
Baydoun, Maguire, Ryan, and Willett (2013) 
conducted a study in Arab countries and found high 
ownership concentration and family dominant firms. 
Consequently, interest is evolving in exploring the 
CG in the Islamic environment of Arab countries 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Baydoun et al., 2013). Islam provides 
comprehensive guidelines for all facets of the 
Muslim community including business and economic 
practices. 
Islamic principles profoundly guide daily life in 
Pakistani society, including economics, law, 
business, and other areas. Additionally, the socio-
economic factors of developing countries, 
particularly Pakistan, are quite different from 
developed countries in terms of legal, political and 
social systems. Thus, these imperative and distinct 
contextual, regulatory and institutional divergences 
can have substantial significance for the efficacy of 
accountability, CG disclosure, and performance. In 
Pakistan, most firms are family-owned and they 
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usually recruit family members or close relatives 
and friends. In this context, merit is compromised in 
employing the employees. Mostly, employees are 
hired on the basis of personal relationships or social 
linkages with the owner of the firm. These 
appointments can have negative impacts on internal 
CG mechanisms like board structure, audit 
committee structure, internal auditors and corporate 
governance monitoring systems. In Pakistan, most of 
the public listed firms are dominated by politicians. 
Researchers also found that CG practices are greatly 
influenced by these political connections and 
appointments are made to corporate boards of firms 
(Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008). Correspondingly, all 
these have negative effects on the independence and 
composition of BoDs. In Pakistan, agency problems 
may be exaggerated due to the high ownership 
concentration (Javid & Iqbal, 2008). This high 
ownership concentration may influence the 
recruitment process in family firms. Baydoun et al. 
(2013) conducted a study among Arab countries but 
it is also applicable to the Pakistani environment. 
They suggested that high ownership concentration 
and dominance of family businesses in Arab 
countries have great influence on employees‟ 
recruitment in some listed firms and only close 
relatives and friends are appointed to corporate 
boards, so consequently, board independence is 
compromised in those firms. Besides these, poor CG 
practices may not only cause the loss of the 
domestic but also of the foreign shareholders. In 
addition, the weak corporate governance regime 
exacerbates information asymmetry in Pakistan and 
consequently has adverse effects on local and 
foreign investment in the country.  
Researchers have documented that institutions 
are predetermined and shaped by the distinct 
national system of the country (Douglass, 1990; 
Gustafsson, Knudsen, & Mäki, 2003). Gilson (1996) 
argued that the economic success of firms is also 
dependent on the institutions of a particular country 
in which they are expected to compete. Sorour and 
Howell (2012) conducted a study in Egyptian banks 
and found that powerful agents drive the political 
process of CG. In a similar vein, Jizi, Salama, Dixon, 
and Stratling (2014) argued that powerful CEOs take 
liberal decisions that may not be in best interest of 
firms. Thus, it is evident that economic actors 
appear to endure more effect on the discretion of 
CG. Researchers also investigated the impact of low 
education on political institutions and found that 
well-educated countries exhibit more stable 
democracies from those poorly educated countries 
(Hanushek & Wößmann, 2007; Jones, 2016; 
Karatnycky, 2002). These findings expound the 
political institutions are more pertinent in educated 
countries as compared to their counterparts (Lipset, 
1960). Cuervo (2002) examined the deficiencies in 
shareholders‟ protection in Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental European systems of CG. He found that 
the enforceability issue in Continental Europe 
restricts the use of codes. The existing literature also 
provides evidence that the dominant religion (Hilary 
& Hui, 2009; McGuire, Omer, & Sharp, 2011) and 
prevailing culture (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), for 
example, are vital for the effectiveness of CG codes. 
In addition, legal institutions can also be confronted 
by legitimacy issues that also emasculate their 
effectiveness. Judge et al. (2008) found three pillars 
(such as legal institutions, culture and particularly, 
corruption) of institutionalization which driving the 
perceptions of CG at the country level. In addition, 
global CG systems cannot be restricted to the 
Anglo-Saxon or Continental European models (Judge 
et al., 2008).  
Researchers also found issues of the legal 
protection of minority shareholders in emerging 
economies (Hasan, Kobeissi, & Song, 2014; Klapper & 
Love, 2004) which raises the question about the role 
of legal institutions in those economies. Similarly, 
corruption is associated with societal elites in many 
weak institutional contexts. Despite the importance 
of the institutional framework, researchers have 
questioned its significance in creating a robust CG 
system (Adegbite et al., 2013; Johanson & Ostergren, 
2010; Przeworski, 2004). Some researchers agreed 
that institutions matter (Adu-Amoah, Tsamenyi, & 
Mensah Onumah, 2008) while others documented 
that institutions do not matter absolutely 
(Przeworski, 2004). It is not possible to design an 
effective CG system without taking political and 
social factors into account (Adu-Amoah et al., 2008).  
In a nutshell, it is documented that institutions 
do play a significant role in developing CG systems; 
however, it depends on the extent of institutional 
sophistication. However, the intuitional 
sophistication may be affected by the 
conditionalities which are intrinsic in a specific 
system. The effects of these conditions depend on 
economic development of particular country. 
Therefore, these conditions are flabbergasted by the 
robustness of existing institutions in developed 
countries while it is divergent in emerging 
economies and affects the CG model adopted in 
emerging countries. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This study used mixed methods research i.e. 
qualitative and quantitative and exploratory 
sequential research design is employed. First, the 
study conducted semi-structured focus group 
interviews, followed by survey method. 
 
3.1. Semi-structured focus group 
 
A focus group is an interview that is conducted with 
a small group of people on a particular topic (Patton, 
2002) and has been widely used in social science 
research for qualitative data collection (Morgan, 
1998). Focus groups are useful in exploring, 
clarifying and reacting to ideas (Krueger, 2014). They 
are an informal discussion among a group of 
selected individuals about a topic (Wilkinson & 
Silverman, 2004) and usually consist of 6 to 10 
participants and a moderator (Howell, 2012). The 
rationale of this group size is to ensure information 
diversity. In addition, the focus group also offers a 
collective set of observations, experiences, and 
values which are interpreted in the context. 
Moreover, it is a qualitative research instrument that 
demonstrates the essential bias for systematic 
attention to specify additional solid ground (Morgan, 
1998). In addition, it is particularly helpful in 
obtaining and discovering new information on the 
same topic (Krueger, 2014) and is more economical. 
Though there are benefits in using a focus group, it 
has some limitations as well.2 Compared to one on 
one interviews, a focus group may not explore more 
in-depth information. In addition, participants may 
not be as cosy as in one-on-one interviews and may 
                                                          
2 (see Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2013) 
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not expose sensitive information.  Researchers 
generally need quite high levels of interviewing 
expertise to conduct focus group interviews. For 
instance, they require „gatekeeping‟ skills to help 
avoid „group think‟ outcomes and preventing any 
individuals from dominating conversations as well 
as teasing contributions from quieter members. That 
said, where the focus group does not present any of 
these dilemmas the researchers should be mostly 
anonymous, often only needing to contribute to 
commence, prompt occasionally and finalize the 
session. 
To overcome the limitations of the focus group, 
this study employed a semi-structured focus group 
in which interviews are conducted, following the 
interview protocol and guide to keep the same 
context and ensure validity and reliability. 
 
3.2. Selection of interviewees and interview 
instrument  
 
Researchers have argued that the data quality 
determines the quality of findings (Saunders, 2011) 
and it is critical to develop criteria for the selection 
of interviewees. This study employed a purposive 
sampling technique and only those respondents 
were considered who had the required experience of 
corporate governance in Pakistan to obtain informed 
opinions (Bailey & Peck, 2013). In line with other 
studies, this study carefully recruited interviewees 
and focused on quality of data rather than quantity 
(see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Consequently, this 
enhanced the reliability of the data. After identifying 
the targeted respondents, the researcher invited 
them to participate in the study through email 
and/or telephonic invitations and provided them 
with a research information sheet, detailing the 
objectives of the study, time required for interview 
and processing to ensure their confidentiality and 
anonymity. These procedures increase creditability 
and encourage respondents to contribute to the 
study (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). After using these 
techniques, a focus group was identified consisting 
of eight participants. The first interview package – 
including an initial invitation email, a follow-up 
email and/or phone call, a consent form and an 
interview guide – was prepared for conducting 
interviews with the agreed participants. 
 
3.3. Interview protocol and guide 
 
Table 1 presents the interview protocol. It can be 
seen that the duration of interviews ranged from 28 
minutes to 43 minutes and interviews were 
conducted with directors/CEO or CG experts and/or 
consultants. A total of eight semi-structured focus 
group interviews were conducted, however, two 
participants did not allow recording of the interview. 
After getting approval from the Human Ethics 
Committee (HEC) of the concerned university, 
written permission (consent form) was taken from 
participants before starting the interview. An 
interview guide is employed to guide the discussion 
and extract the information from participants 
(Smith, 2015). Similarly, Bryman and Bell (2015) 
suggested that the interview guide needs to be 
comprised of questions that address the underlying 
research problem to conduct a semi-structured 
focus group. Hence, an interview guide, consisting of 
brief questions, is used to conduct the semi-
structured focus group. 
 
Table 1. Interview protocol 
 
Interview type Semi-structured focus group 
Duration of interview  28 - 43 minutes 
Level of interviewees  Director/CEO/ CG experts or consultants 
Number of respondents  8 
Purpose and style  Information extraction and exploration 
Interview place  Online or office 
Language  English  
Confidentiality High  
Morality and ethics  
Took Human Ethics Committee approval from the relevant university. Written consent is taken from 
participants 
Recording responses  
At the start of the interview, the interviewer told respondents that it will be recorded, and recording 
is started after their approval.   
Information exchange 
Detailed information was provided about the project and process. Preliminary questions were 
addressed in advance.   
Question types  Open ended 
 
3.4. Final interviews 
 
The initial contacts were made through an email 
invitation, followed up by email and or/telephone. As 
only eight participants agreed to participate in the 
research, the interviews were conducted face to face 
and/or over skype, following the same interview 
protocol to ensure consistency among interviewees; 
however, different probes and prompts were used to 
gather as much as possible in-depth information from 
each interviewee. In addition to audio recording of 
interviews, notes were taken as back up. 
 
3.5. Ethical considerations 
 
In qualitative research, it is pivotal to consider 
ethical issues (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The research 
ethics are considered in three stages including 
before, conducting interviews and collection 
(Saunders, 2011). Similarly, Bryman and Bell (2015) 
suggested that interviewees should know about the 
purpose, the nature of the study and their rights of 
withdrawal from the interview. The research ethics 
are considered during data analysis and reporting of 
findings by keeping the confidentiality of 
interviewees. Similarly, Linck and Netter (2008) 
argued that interviewees‟ information should be 
treated confidentially and the interviewees‟ privacy 
ensured at every stage (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In 
addition, Lichtman (2013) argued that the researcher 
should ask appropriate questions and avoid 
questions about the personal lives of interviewees. 
This research study is approved by the Human 
Ethics Committee of concerned university. 
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3.6. Analysis of the semi-structured focus group 
 
All the semi-structured focus group interviews were 
transcribed verbatim into Microsoft Word. Only the 
researcher was involved in the transcription process 
in order to achieve the highest level of familiarity 
with the data before commencing analysis. Each 
respondent was assigned a pseudonym to hide their 
identity. Table 2 presents a summary of all the 
interviews: 
 
Table 2. Summary of interviewees 
 
Pseudonym Experience Position Interview status 
R1 20 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R2 11 years Consultant- Corporate Governance Recorded and notes were taken 
R3 9 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R4 8 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R5 17 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R6 14 years Head of CG Compliance Recorded and notes were taken 
R7 9 years Legal Consultant-Corporate Governance Not recorded- only notes were taken 
R8 16 years Senior Manager – Corporate Governance Not recorded- only notes were taken 
 
The transcribed data were transferred to a 
qualitative software package called NVivo for 
analysis. The use of software reduces the chances of 
making mistakes, analyses the data more effectively 
and avoids missing key concepts (Quinlan, 2011). 
NVivo data analysis involved summarizing data into 
different categories based on concepts and themes 
(Neuman & Robson, 2014; Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). 
The study employed a coding process, consisting of 
three stages. Open coding is the first stage where the 
researcher goes through the transcribed interview to 
abridge the data into codes based on research 
interests. This stage creates numerous codes 
considered as sub-categories. Axial coding is the 
next phase, where the researcher finds common and 
repeating ideas by looking for the relationships and 
links among the sub-categories. This stage creates 
fundamental categories from the previous stage sub-
categories (codes). Selective coding is the final stage 
in the coding of qualitative data where the 
researcher discovers the aggregate themes by 
looking into all the categories and subcategories. 
These new generated themes are called core themes 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011; Neuman & Robson, 2014; 
Quinlan, 2011) and directly related to the research 
questions.  
The first stage of the coding process generated 
131 open codes. In the second stage, the primary 
codes were revised by grouping similar codes with 
the same ideas in order to produce axial codes. This 
stage resulted in 11 key codes and 41 sub-
codes/themes. The researcher then scanned all 
generated codes and sub-codes to develop the final 
core codes. This final coding stage resulted in eight 
core codes (themes) aligned with the research 
question (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Semi-structured focus group – themes and 
codes  
 
Themes Codes 
Auditing 
Auditor Independence 
Audit Committee 
Risk Management 
Political 
Political System 
Political Influences 
Corruption 
Legal 
Compliance 
Enforcement 
Regulators 
Board 
Board independence 
Board heterogeneity 
Nepotism/Kinship 
Shareholders’ 
awareness 
Shareholders’ Rights Protection 
Education and Training 
Values 
Family System 
Interpersonal Connections 
Culture 
Institutional Culture 
Organizational Whistle-Blowers 
Voting AGM participation 
Quantitative research can be explanatory, 
predictive and confirmative in nature. A survey is a 
famous type of quantitative method which offers 
information on what people perceive (Nardi, 2018; 
Neuman & Robson, 2014). 
 
3.7. Population and sample 
 
A population is an entire set of individuals, events 
or subjects of interest that the researcher wishes to 
investigate (Mugenda, 2003; Sekaran, 2003) and it is 
pivotal to define the population and sample to 
ensure that the sample is an accurate representation 
of the population. The population of the study 
consists of all the 579 firms listed on the Pakistan 
Stock Exchange (PSX) and the sample should be 
drawn carefully to represent the whole population. 
However, researchers also documented some 
determinants such as research objectives, time and 
cost, proposed analysis and size of population that 
may affect decisions regarding selection of the 
sample size (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016; Veal, 2005). In 
addition, Kothari (2004) suggested that the sample 
size should not be too large or too small. 
Consequently, this research used a purposive 
sampling technique to recruit the sample. This 
technique has been widely used in the existing 
studies on CG in different countries (Anis, 2013; 
Fuzuli, Pahala, & Murdayanti, 2013; Mariri & 
Chipunza, 2011; Nur‟ainy, Nurcahyo, Sri Kurniasih, & 
Sugiharti, 2013). This is a type of non-probability 
sampling technique in which the sample is selected 
in view of the purpose and defined criteria (Zikmund 
et al., 2013). This research excluded the financial 
companies from the sample due to their different 
CG structure. In a similar vein, Neuman and Robson 
(2014) argued that a purposive sampling technique 
is appropriate when researcher aims to attain a 
profound understanding of underlying research 
theme and have already selected their sample. The 
sample is recruited on two basic criteria. First, only 
those companies were contacted which had recent 
annual reports available (2017 or 2018)3 because the 
study used the performance data from annual 
reports of the companies. Second, the survey was 
conducted from different respondents including 
managers, accountants, auditors or other members 
of organizations who were involved in the 
preparation of CG reports. Based on the above 
criteria, the questionnaire was distributed to 350 
                                                          
3 In Pakistan, some companies have their year ending in June while some 
have December. 
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respondents4, however, only 120 questionnaires 
were received. Out of 120 filled questionnaires, 15 
questionnaires were incomplete, hence, making a 
final sample of 105 respondents. 
 
3.8. Questionnaire survey 
 
The study used the questionnaire survey to collect 
the primary data from respondents. Collis and 
Hussey (2013) documented that a questionnaire is a 
list of carefully chosen structured questions that are 
executed after considerable testing to elicit 
responses from respondents. In a similar vein, 
Sekaran (2003) argued that a questionnaire is a 
written set of questions to record respondents‟ 
answers. In addition, Zikmund et al. (2013) 
documented that the questionnaire method is very 
helpful in getting information from respondents 
related to the research problem and helps decision-
makers to address the problem. Existing literature 
also provides evidence that a survey questionnaire is 
commonly used in the area of social sciences and all 
respondents were asked to answer the same 
questions in same circumstances (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012).  
In line with the views of Oppenheim (1992) and 
Foddy and Foddy (1994), this study used a survey 
questionnaire for several reasons. It is the most 
commonly used method for data collection and 
ensures the anonymity of respondents; 
consequently, respondents respond in a more free 
and convenient manner. Hence, the credibility of 
data and research is increased. It is appropriate for 
individual researchers who have a shorter time span 
and limited resources. The survey questionnaire can 
easily disseminate to a larger sample which 
increases the credibility of data and generalizability 
of results. In addition, researchers also documented 
that a survey questionnaire is the best method of 
gathering data because CG studies are descriptive in 
nature (Alleyne, Howard, & Greenidge, 2006; 
Denscombe, 2014; Jones, Baxter, & Khanduja, 2013; 
Paape, Scheffe, & Snoep, 2003). There are two types 
of questionnaires as documented by Oppenheim 
(1992) and Bryman and Bell (2015). First is the self-
administered questionnaire which can be conducted 
into three ways i.e. postal, internet-mediated and 
hand-delivered and collected (Jones et al., 2013). The 
second type is the interviewer-administered 
questionnaire which is classified into two types i.e. 
the structured interview and telephone questionnaire 
(Jones et al., 2013). Additionally, researchers also 
documented that the choice of questionnaire 
depends on many factors including sample size, 
respondents‟ characteristics, purpose of data 
gathering and number of questions (Saunders, 2011). 
Keeping in view the objectives of the study, the 
self-administrated questionnaire was suitable and 
employed for several reasons. It was more 
appropriate in the Pakistani context due to 
authenticity5, time savings, being easy to distribute, 
cheaper and kept anonymity that encouraged 
respondents and increased the response rate. In 
addition, existing studies on CG have already 
                                                          
4 There is a total of 579 PSX listed firms in Pakistan, however, only 365 
firms fulfilled the set criteria. Out of 365 companies, 15 companies were 
further excluded and were used in the pilot study. 
5 Due to many fraudulent emails and links, respondents are not comfortable 
with filling the questionnaires online which may reduce response rate. In 
addition, sometimes, emails go to a spam folder to protect from fraudulent 
activities. 
utilized this method (Goodwin & Seow, 2002; 
Hussain & Mallin, 2003; Solomon, Lin, Norton, & 
Solomon, 2003). Though the self-administrated 
questionnaire can be distributed through the post, 
internet, and hand delivery, researchers argued that 
the hand delivery method is the most appropriate 
for several reasons (Jones et al., 2013; Sekaran, 
2003). It provides an opportunity for the researcher 
to motivate respondents to answer truly by 
providing a brief introduction to the research topic. 
Moreover, the researcher can collect responses in a 
shorter time and can clarify any ambiguity of 
respondents about questions. In addition, the 
questionnaire can be distributed to a large sample in 
a less expensive way as compared to interview and 
requires fewer skills. The researcher hired two 
research assistants to distribute the questionnaire to 
respondents to save time and cost.6 The distribution 
and collection of questionnaires took two months. 
 
3.9. Questionnaire design 
 
Researchers have argued that the questionnaire 
design is a very complex process and guidelines 
need to be followed (Collis & Hussey, 2013). The 
questionnaire needs to be in simple and concise 
language to ensure the respondents understand the 
meaning of questions in the same way. Moreover, 
questions need to be specific so that respondents do 
not give several answers. The questionnaire was 
formulated from multiple sources7 to ensure validity 
(Brace, 2018; Jann & Hinz, 2016; Perkins & Peterson, 
2005). The survey questionnaire employed several 
kinds of questions such as Likert scale and multiple-
choice questions. The questionnaire consists of four 
parts including demographic information to increase 
participants‟ confidence (Kelley, Clark, Brown, & 
Sitzia, 2003). The first part comprises the questions 
linked to the level of CG compliance, measured 
through a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) 
strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. The first part 
consisted of 48 CCG 2012 provisions, divided into 
seven sub-sections i.e. Auditing, BoDs, 
Charters/laws, Directors‟ Education, Executive 
Director Compensation, Ownership and Progressive 
Practice. This section represents the independent 
variable of the study and is used to compute the CG 
index (CGI) score.  
The second and third parts comprise barriers 
and drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan, 
respectively, which are also measured through a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly 
disagree to (5) strongly agree. The part two (barriers) 
consists of seventeen items: (1) Lack of Auditors‟ 
Independence, (2) Board Ineffectiveness, (3) 
Institutional Culture of Pakistan, (4) Political and 
Governmental Interference in Business Activities, (5) 
Weak Legal Control and Enforcement, (6) Lack of 
Shareholders‟ Awareness, (7) Lack of Resources for 
CG Compliance, (8) Lack of Shareholders‟ Rights 
Protection especially Minority Shareholders, (9) Lack 
of Protection for Whistle Blowers, (10) Lack of 
Professional Education and Training among 
Stakeholders, (11) Fewer Voting Rights, (12) Low 
                                                          
6 The researcher was based in New Zealand and it was not possible for the 
researcher to go back to Pakistan to collect survey data due to time and huge 
travelling costs. Therefore, two research assistants were hired who have 
relevant qualifications and experience to save time and cost. In addition, a 
pilot study was conducted which helped in training the research assistant 
(Connelly, 2008). 
7 The questionnaire is developed based on provisions of CCG 2012 and 
findings of the qualitative study. 
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AGM Participation, (13) High Level of Corruption, 
(14) Nepotism or Kinship Culture, (15) 
Wobbly/unstable Economy of Pakistan, (16) Strong 
Social Ties among Different Stakeholders, and (17) 
Interpersonal Connections among BoDs. The part 
three (drivers) consists of twelve items: (1) Auditors 
Independence, (2) Internal Control and Risk 
Management, (3) Provide Protection to Whistle 
Blowers, (4) Enhancing and Empowering Professional 
Regulatory Bodies, (5) Board Heterogeneity, (6) Board 
Independence, (7) Encouraging Participation in 
Events and Conferences related to Corporate 
Governance, (8) Enhancing Partnership with 
International Regulatory Bodies i.e. OECD, IFC to 
Promote CG in Pakistan, (9) Provide Accounting and 
Auditing Education to Internal Stakeholders, (10) 
Initiation of Training Programs for Directors, raise 
Awareness and Education for CEOs, Directors, 
Shareholders and Board Members, (11) Establish 
Corporate Governance Education Programs at 
Universities, and (12) Promote CG Research in 
Pakistan. Finally, the part four comprises 
respondents‟ demographic information including 
age, position within organization, qualification, 
specialization, and experience within job. 
 
3.10. Pilot study 
 
A pilot study is widely used by researchers to reduce 
errors at very minimal costs. After designing the 
questionnaire, a pilot test was conducted to ensure 
the validity and reliability of the instruments and 
procedure for data collection. The purpose of 
conducting a pilot study is manifold. It helps in 
developing and testing the adequacy of the research 
instrument, designing and testing protocols for 
study, collecting preliminary data and training of 
research assistants (Connelly, 2008). In addition, the 
participants in a pilot study are not included in the 
final sample to avoid response bias. Connelly (2008) 
stresses that a pilot study sample should be at least 
10% of the total sample size of the study. Hence, this 
research conducted a pilot study from 15 
respondents to fulfill the aforementioned objectives.  
 
3.11. Validity and reliability 
 
The instruments were pre-tested to ensure the 
content and face validity by analysing consistency 
and interpretation. For this purpose, the 
questionnaire was sent to experts in the field of CG 
to eliminate ambiguity and inadequacy. Simple 
words and language were used to ensure validity. 
Moreover, redundant and complicated terminologies 
were eliminated. The items were tested for their 
reliability through Cronbach Alpha with the help of 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 24. The 
Cronbach Alpha indicates how well items in a set are 
positively correlated to each other and Cronbach 
Alpha is determined for the items. The results of 
Cronbach Alpha are presented below (Table 4): 
 
Table 4. Cronbach Alpha value of instrument 
 
Parts Variables 
Number of 
total items 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
1 
Level of Corporate 
Governance Compliance 
48 0.892 
2 
Barriers to Good 
Governance Practices 
17 0.854 
3 
Drivers of Good 
Governance Practices  
12 0.845 
As seen in Table 4, the Cronbach Alphas for all 
three parts were above 0.70. The coefficient of 
Cronbach Alpha ranges between zero to one and 
above 0.7 is considered as highly reliable (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2016). 
 
3.12. Data collection and analysis 
 
In addition to primary data, this research also used 
secondary data for analysis. The primary data is 
gathered via a survey questionnaire as discussed. 
Secondary data has some advantages over primary 
data due to its time and cost-effectiveness 
(Saunders, 2011; Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Similarly, 
Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) documented that it is 
desirable to use secondary data over primary data to 
answer the research questions if it is available. 
Consequently, this study also used secondary data 
to measure firm performance such as return of 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) which is 
collected from recent annual reports of sampled 
firms.8 
A research study produces massive raw data 
and it is necessary to organize and score data 
systematically for data analysis (Collins, 2003). In 
this research, the data is gathered from PSX listed 
firms through self-administrated questionnaires. 
The data analysis is a fascinating, creative and time-
consuming process (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). This 
research used descriptive statistics, exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA), correlation and regression 
analysis to achieve the research objectives and SPSS 
24 was used as a tool for data analysis. First, this 
research employed explanatory factor analysis (EFA) 
which is an interdependence method for classifying 
the most influential barriers and drivers of good CG 
practices in Pakistan. The factor analysis 
investigates the inter-correlations between the items 
and reduces them into small groups. The factors 
within a group are quite similar in meaning and 
represent the same meaning. This technique allows 
the researcher to determine underlying factors or 
dimensions that exist in a given data set. This 
technique is useful in academic and managerial 
research in reducing the items into discrete 
dimensions that can be further aggregated. Second 
this research estimated a hierarchical multiple linear 
regression model for the study which is mentioned 
below: 
 
                                             
                  
(1) 
 
where,  
   = Constant; 
Demographic variables: age, qualification, 
specialization, experience which is collected from 
the survey questionnaire; 
Firm Performance: ROA and ROE from annual reports; 
ROA = Net income/Total assets; 
ROE = Net income/Total shareholders‟ equity; 
CGI Score: Corporate Governance Index (CGI) Score 
which is calculated from the survey questionnaire; 
ε: Error term. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Data is collected only for those firms, who filled in the survey questionnaire. 
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4. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
4.1. Demographic results 
 
The results of the demographic information of 
respondents are presented in Table 5. There were a 
total of 105 respondents. These respondents were 
from different industries such as automobiles, 
cement, chemicals, textiles, sugar, engineering, 
fertilizer, oil and gas, and food and beverages. The 
result reveals that most respondents (39%) were 
aged between 31 and 40 years while only 3.8% of 
respondents were above 60 years of age. Table 5 
reveals that 12.4% respondents were 30 years or less 
while 11.4% respondents were aged 51 to 60 years of 
age. There were 33.3% respondents aged from 41 to 
50 years. The respondents were predominantly 
middle-aged (39+33.3+11.4 = 83.7) which is considered 
a reliable source of providing information for this 
study. Regarding position, the results reveal that 
most of the respondents (42.9%) held the position of 
manager while 33.3% were in senior manager 
positions. There were only 8.6% respondents in the 
position of auditor while 15.2% of respondents were 
in the position of accountant. Coupling the 
demographic information on age and position is a 
way of providing reliable data for steady analysis.  
 
 
Table 5. Results of demographic information of respondents 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Age 
30 years or less 13 12.4 
31 to 40 years 41 39 
41 to 50 years 35 33.3 
51 to 60 years 12 11.4 
Above 60 years 4 3.8 
Position 
Senior Manager 35 33.3 
Manager 45 42.9 
Accountant 16 15.2 
Auditor 9 8.6 
Qualification 
PhD or equivalent 10 9.5 
Masters or equivalent 51 48.6 
Bachelors or equivalent 33 31.4 
Diploma or Professional 8 7.6 
Other 3 2.9 
Specialization 
Finance 28 26.7 
Accounting 36 34.3 
Economics 28 26.7 
Management 11 10.5 
Other 2 1.9 
Experience 
1 to 5 years 19 18.1 
6 to 10 years 42 40 
11 to 15 years 43 41 
16 to 20 years 1 1 
N= 105    
 
The results also reveal that most of the 
respondents (34.3%) have specialization in 
accounting while only 1.9% of respondents have 
other specializations. There were 10.5% respondents 
who have specialization in management while both 
finance and economic specialization holders are 
each 26.7%. 
Regarding experience, results reveal that most 
of the respondents (41%) have 11 to 15 years of 
experience while 40% of respondents have 6 to 10 
years of experience. The 18.1% respondents who 
were in their early career have 1 to 5 years of 
experience, while only one respondent has 16 to 20 
years of experience. All in all, the respondents are 
mature experienced managers. 
The results of the demographic information also 
reveal that 48.6% of respondents have a master‟s 
degree or equivalent qualification, while only 2.9% of 
respondents have other qualifications. It is 
highlighted that only 9.5% of respondents have PhDs 
or equivalent qualifications while Bachelors‟ and 
Diploma holders were 31.4 % and 7.6% respectively. 
4.2. Results of descriptive statistics and correlation 
analysis 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis are presented in Table 6. The 
results show the correlation between explanatory 
variables such as CGI score and dependent variables 
i.e. ROA and ROE while controlling for the effect of 
age, position, qualification, specialization, and 
experience of respondents. Table 6 also presents the 
descriptive statistics of the CGI score, ROA and ROE. 
The CGI score has a mean value of 162.5619 with a 
standard deviation of 15.101531. The ROA has a 
mean value of 0.06426 with a standard deviation of 
0.067981, while the ROE has a mean value of 
0.11491 with a standard deviation of 0.179549. The 
results of the correlation analysis revealed that the 
CGI score has a significant positive (p <0.01) 
association with both ROA and ROE at the 0.01 level 
of significance. 
 
 
Table 6. Results of the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
 
Control Variables 
 
Mean Std. deviation CGI Score ROA ROE 
Age & Position & 
Qualification & 
Specialization & 
Experience 
CGI Score 162.5619 15.101531 1 
  
ROA 0.06426 0.067981 0.610*** 1 
 
ROE 0.11491 0.179549 0.431*** 0.839*** 1 
Note: ***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Where the total CGI Score is the total score of CG compliance 
obtained from the survey questionnaire. ROA is return on assets while ROE is return on equity. 
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Table 6 shows that there is a significant 
positive relationship (r = 0.610) between CGI score 
and return on assets at the 0.01 level of significance. 
Similarly, Table 6 reveals a significant positive 
correlation (r = 0.431) between CGI and return on 
equity at the 0.01 level of significance. The results of 
the correlation analyses are supported by prior 
studies (Javid & Iqbal, 2008; Maranho & Leal, 2018; 
Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2014; Tariq & Abbas, 
2013) that found significant positive relationships 
between the CGI score, ROA and ROE.  
 
4.3. Barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
This section presents the results of exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) regarding barriers to good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. The 
survey includes 17 items that were measured on the 
five-point Likert scale. The results of Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett‟s tests are presented in 
Table 7. KMO measure the sampling adequacy and 
should be greater than 0.5 for performing 
satisfactory factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) and 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) provided guidelines for 
interpreting these values.9 Table 7 reveals that the 
KMO has a value of 0.702 which shows the adequacy 
of the sample for EFA. 
 
Table 7. KMO and Bartlett‟s test for barriers to good 
CG practices 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.702 
Bartlett‟s test of sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1561.297 
 
df 136 
 
Sig. 0.000 
 
In addition to KMO, Bartlett‟s test of sphericity 
that estimates which inter-correlation matrix 
produced is an identity matrix. Generally, the value 
of P < 0.05 on Bartlett‟s test indicates that the inter-
correlation matrix is not an identity matrix and 
factor analysis can be performed. In Table 8, 
Bartlett‟s test is highly significant (P < 0.05) which 
shows that EFA can be run for the extraction of 
factors by including all the items.  
In EFA, the next step is the extraction of 
factors. Researchers have argued that factors are 
extracted until the value of variance is maximized 
(Mvududu & Sink, 2013) and different methods can 
be employed to extract factors. This study employed 
the principal axis factoring (PAF) method to extract 
the factors. This method is a preferred approach in 
the presence of a multivariate normality problem 
and when the researcher aims to find latent factors 
in the study. In addition, the PAF extraction method 
generates reliable results despite the high or low 
                                                          
9 The value of KMO test is considered good if it is more than 0.60 (see 
Kaiser, 1974; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
values of commonalities (Kahn, 2006). It is 
important for researchers to examine which evolving 
constructs could be retained for additional 
interpretation or analysis. The factor retention 
decision has important implications. First, it should 
have more effect on overall EFA results (Zwick & 
Velicer, 1986). Secondly, it is necessary to balance 
the need for frugality while effectively 
demonstrating fundamental correlations (Fabrigar, 
Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Third, 
researchers argued that under-extraction and over-
extraction can alter the overall EFA and its 
interpretation (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007).  
It is also noted that the number of factors 
retained varies across studies and different criteria 
have been used to make a decision. The following 
criteria (i.e. eigenvalue, scree test and variance 
explained) have been used in this study to make a 
decision about factor retention. Kaiser (1960) 
suggested that only those factors are retained for 
interpretation that have eigenvalues greater than 1.0. 
Eigenvalues represent the explained variable by a 
given factor. The benchmark of establishing 
eigenvalue 1.0 seems arbitrary, however, researchers 
documented that factors that have eigenvalues 
greater than one should be retained because these 
represent those factors that contribute to a higher 
percentage of communal variance than average 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). In addition to 
eigenvalue, there is an alternative approach called 
the Scree test to determine factors‟ retention and 
involves developing a scree plot of extracted factors 
against the magnitude of their eigenvalues (Cattell, 
1966; DeVellis, 2016). In this approach, the 
researcher needs to identify an elbow or break 
where larger eigenvalues end in steep slope rambling 
off of smaller eigenvalues begins. Cattell (1966) 
suggested that only left side factors of the elbow are 
retained while right side factors are dropped. 
Another common method about making a 
decision regarding factor retention is examining the 
cumulative variance accounted for by retained 
factors. Various sources recommended numerous 
levels from 50% onwards and there is no exact 
percentage of total variance explained. However, 
most statisticians and scholars recommended 
factors that are required to obtain a variance of 75% 
to 90% (see Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 
2006; Peterson, 2000; Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003). 
Based on the above criteria (i.e. Eigenvalue, Scree 
test, and Total variance), this study only retained 
five factors that have eigenvalues of greater than 
one as shown in Table 8. The Scree test also reveals 
the elbow after five factors. In addition, Table 8 also 
reveals that these five factors explain the cumulative 
variance of 80.29% which is recommended by other 
researchers. 
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Table 8. Total variance explained for barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
Factor Initial eigenvalues 
Extraction sums of squared 
loadings 
Rotation sums of squared loadings 
 
Total 
% of 
variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 5.86 34.476 34.476 5.66 33.299 33.299 3.67 21.595 21.595 
2 2.92 17.187 51.663 2.63 15.467 48.766 2.74 16.092 37.687 
3 2.28 13.408 65.072 2.05 12.06 60.826 2.54 14.947 52.635 
4 1.41 8.273 73.344 1.1 6.446 67.272 1.85 10.876 63.511 
5 1.18 6.954 80.298 0.93 5.457 72.728 1.57 9.217 72.728 
6 0.87 5.097 85.396 
      
7 0.56 3.314 88.71 
      
8 0.46 2.677 91.387 
      
9 0.39 2.285 93.672 
      
10 0.29 1.675 95.346 
      
11 0.2 1.156 96.503 
      
12 0.18 1.074 97.576 
      
13 0.15 0.895 98.471 
      
14 0.1 0.565 99.036 
      
15 0.08 0.496 99.532 
      
16 0.04 0.249 99.781 
      
17 0.04 0.219 100 
      
Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring (PAF). 
 
In Table 8, there are three main components, 
i.e. initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared 
loadings and rotation sums of squared loadings. The 
first factor has eigenvalues of 5.861 and these 
explain 34.476% of variance explained. Similarly, the 
second factor has an eigenvalue of 2.922 and 
explains 17.187% of the variance, making a 
cumulative variance of 51.663%. The third factor has 
an eigenvalue of 2.279 and explains 13.408% of 
variance, making a cumulative variance of 65.072%. 
The fourth factor has an eigenvalue of 1.406 and 
explains 8.273% of variance and cumulative 
variances reach 73.344%. Finally, the fifth factor has 
an eigenvalue of 1.182 and explains 6.954% of 
variance and cumulative variance reaches 80.298% 
which is within the recommended range by the 
researchers (Hair et al., 2006; Peterson, 2000; Pett et 
al., 2003).  
 
Figure 1. Scree plot of EFA for barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
 
 
Figure 1 reveals the scree plot of EFA for 
barriers to good corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. The scree plot graphically presents the 
eigenvalues in descending order. It can be seen that 
the first factor has an eigenvalue of 5.861 while the 
second factor has an eigenvalue of 2.922. Similarly, 
the third, fourth and fifth factors have eigenvalues 
of 2.279, 1.406 and 1.182 respectively. In addition, 
an elbow can be seen after factor five. As suggested 
by Cattell (1966), only these five factors are retained 
in this study that was on left side of the elbow and 
the right side factors were dropped.  
It is often difficult to interpret factors that are 
initially extracted and retained. Consequently, 
Dimitrov (2014) recommended that researchers need 
to rotate these factors to more suitable positions to 
create the simplest possible factor structure, 
maximize high loading and minimize low loadings. 
The idea of rotating factors stems from the work of 
researchers such as Thurstone (1947) and Cattell 
(1966) who saw it as a way of simplifying factor 
structures so they could be more reliably 
interpreted. In SPSS, researchers have to choose 
either orthogonal or oblique rotation strategies that 
have quite different fundamental assumptions but 
have same goal (i.e. seeking simple structure) (Hair 
et al., 2006; Pett et al., 2003). In orthogonal rotation, 
it is assumed that factors are independent of one 
another, consequently, they are kept in a fixed 
position and it is expected that newly rotated factors 
are uncorrelated. Varimax, quartimax, and equamax 
are three common orthogonal rotation algorithms 
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and varimax is the most widely used and easy to 
interpret (Dimitrov, 2014). This study selected 
varimax from the rotation menu and chose to 
suppress factors, having a coefficient score of less 
than 0.50 due to small sample size (due to the small 
sample, this study supressed the small coefficient of 
absolute value of 0.5 (Andy, 2000, p. 440)). Table 9 
presents the rotated results of principal axial 
factoring for barriers to good corporate governance 
practices in Pakistan. 
Factor loadings were considered in evaluating 
the factors retention that represent barriers of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan and only 
those factors were retained which had a minimum 
factor loading of 0.7 that is considered excellent (see 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Table 9 reveals that 17 
items that were included in EFA were extracted and 
loaded into five factors. Factor 1 (three items) 
comprised lack of auditors‟ independence, board 
ineffectiveness and lack of shareholders‟ awareness. 
Factor 2 (three items) comprised political and 
governmental interference in business activities, 
weak legal control and enforcement and high levels 
of corruption. Factor 3 (two items) comprised strong 
social ties among different stakeholders and 
interpersonal connections among BoDs. Factor 4 
(one item) comprised lack of professional education 
and training among stakeholders. In the end, 
Factor 5 (one item) comprised fewer voting rights.  
 
 
Table 9. Rotated factor matrixa for barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of auditors‟ independence 0.748     
Board ineffectiveness 0.866     
Lack of shareholders‟ awareness 0.822     
Political and governmental interference in business activities  0.762    
Weak legal control and enforcement  0.752    
High levels of corruption  0.759    
Strong social ties among different stakeholders   0.722   
Interpersonal connections among BoDs   0.786   
Lack of professional education and training among stakeholders   0.722   
Fewer voting rights    0.845 0.718 
Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring (PAF). 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 12 iterations. 
 
Based on item loading and shared 
characteristics on each factor, the researcher 
assigned factor labels. Factor 1 is labelled as firm-
level barriers, Factor 2 is labelled as external 
barriers, Factor 3 is labelled as social barriers, and 
Factor 4 is labelled as education and training 
barriers while Factor 5 is labelled as legal barriers. 
 
4.4. Drivers of good CG practice in Pakistan 
 
This section presents the results of exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) regarding drivers of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. The 
survey includes 12 items that were measured on a 
five-point Likert scale. The results of Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett‟s tests are presented in 
Table 10. KMO measures the sampling adequacy and 
should be greater than 0.5 for performing 
satisfactory factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) and 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) provided guidelines for 
interpreting these values (the value of KMO test is 
considered good if it is more than 0.60 (Kaiser, 1974; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007)). Table 10 reveals that 
KMO has a value of 0.735 which shows the adequacy 
of the sample for EFA. In addition to KMO, Bartlett‟s 
test of sphericity that estimates which inter-
correlation matrix produced is an identity matrix. 
Generally, the value of P < 0.05 on Bartlett‟s test 
indicates that the inter-correlation matrix is not an 
identity matrix and factor analysis can be 
performed. In Table 10, Bartlett‟s test is highly 
significant (P < 0.05) which shows that EFA can be 
run for extraction of factors by including all the 
items. 
Table 10. KMO and Bartlett‟s test for drivers of good 
CG practices in Pakistan 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.735 
Bartlett‟s test of sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 868.428 
df 
 
66 
Sig.   0.000 
 
Based on the criteria (i.e. Eigenvalue, Scree test, 
and Total variance), this study only retained four 
factors that have eigenvalues of greater than one as 
shown in Table 11. The Scree test also reveals the 
elbow shape after the fourth factor. In addition, 
Table 11 also reveals that these four factors explain 
the cumulative variance of 77.728%, which is 
recommended by other researchers (Pett et al., 
2003). In Table 11, there are three main components, 
i.e. initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared 
loadings and rotation sums of squared loadings. The 
first factor has eigenvalues of 5.504 and these 
explain 45.866% of variance explained. Similarly, the 
second factor has an eigenvalue of 1.545 and 
explains 12.872% of variance, making a cumulative 
variance of 58.738%. The third factor has an 
eigenvalue of 1.252 and explains 10.437% of 
variance, making a cumulative variance of 69.174%. 
In the end, the fourth factor has an eigenvalue of 
1.026 and explains 8.554% of the variance and 
cumulative variances reach 77.728%, which is within 
the range recommended by Pett et al. (2003) and 
Hair et al. (2006). 
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Table 11. Total variance explained for drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
Component Initial eigenvalues 
Extraction sums of squared 
loadings 
Rotation sums of squared loadings 
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 5.504 45.866 45.866 5.504 45.866 45.866 4.228 35.236 35.236 
2 1.545 12.872 58.738 1.545 12.872 58.738 2.404 20.037 55.273 
3 1.252 10.437 69.174 1.252 10.437 69.174 1.354 11.285 66.558 
4 1.026 8.554 77.728 1.026 8.554 77.728 1.34 11.17 77.728 
5 0.701 5.842 83.571 
      
6 0.667 5.554 89.125 
      
7 0.459 3.824 92.949 
      
8 0.307 2.556 95.505 
      
9 0.224 1.869 97.375 
      
10 0.155 1.289 98.663 
      
11 0.091 0.761 99.424 
      
12 0.069 0.576 100 
      
Extraction method: Principal component analysis 
 
Figure 2. Scree plot of EFA for drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
 
 
Figure 2 reveals the scree plot of EFA for 
drivers of good corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. The scree plot graphically presents the 
eigenvalues in descending order. It can be seen that 
the first factor has an eigenvalue of 5.504 while the 
second factor has an eigenvalue of 1.545. Similarly, 
the third and fourth factors have eigenvalues of 
1.252 and 1.026 respectively. In addition, an elbow 
shape can be seen after the fourth factor. As 
suggested by Cattell (1966), only these four factors 
that were on left side of the elbow are retained in 
this study and the right side factors were dropped. 
Table 12 presents the rotated results of principal 
component analysis for drivers of good corporate 
governance practices in Pakistan. Factor loadings are 
considered in evaluating the factors retention that 
represent drivers of good corporate governance 
practices in Pakistan and only those factors were 
retained which had a minimum factor loading of 0.7 
that is considered excellent (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Table 12 reveals that 12 items that were 
included in EFA are extracted and loaded into four 
factors. Factor 1 (four items) comprised auditors‟ 
independence, board heterogeneity, board 
independence and initiate training programs for 
directors, raise awareness and education for CEOs, 
directors, shareholders, and board members. 
Factor 2 (one item) comprised enhancing and 
empowering professional regulatory bodies. Factor 3 
(one item) comprised encouraging participation in 
events and conferences related to corporate 
governance). Finally, Factor 4 (one item) comprised 
enhance partnership with international regulatory 
bodies i.e. OECD, IFC to promote CG in Pakistan. 
 
Table 12. Rotated factor matrixa for drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
  Component 
1 2 3 4 
Auditors‟ independence 0.867 
   
Board heterogeneity 0.792 
   
Board independence 0.804 
   
Initiate training programs for directors, raise awareness and education for CEOs, 
directors, shareholders, and board members 
0.915 
   
Enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies 
 
0.88 
  
Encouraging participation in events and conferences related to corporate governance 
  
0.869 
 
Enhance partnership with international regulatory bodies i.e. OECD, IFC to promote CG 
in Pakistan    
0.824 
Extraction method: Principal component analysis.  
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Looking at the item loading on each factor, the 
researcher identified factor labels based on the 
shared characteristics of each item. Factor 1 is 
labelled as internal drivers, Factor 2 is labelled as 
regulatory drivers, and Factor 3 is labelled as 
motivational drivers while Factor 4 is labelled as 
collaborative drivers. 
 
4.5. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis of ROA 
 
Multiple regression analysis is a type of test that 
analyses the amount of variance explained in a 
dependent variable by one or more independent 
variables, while hierarchical multiple regression 
adds another piece to it and allows researchers to 
determine the R2 change and change in F-statistics.  
The results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
are presented in Table 13. There is a total of two 
models. In Model 1, only the effect of demographic 
factors such as age, position, qualification, 
specialization, and experience are measured on ROA. In 
addition to multiple hierarchical regression, the 
collinearity tests are also conducted. In Model 1, it 
can be seen that all the demographic factors have a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of greater than 1, it 
means there is no multi-collinearity among variables. 
Model 1 shows the R2 value of 0.092, it means 9.2% 
variance independent variable (ROA) is explained by 
these demographic variables.  
In Model 2, the CGI score is also added to 
investigate its impact on ROA. The Model 2 reveals 
that CGI score has a significant positive impact on 
ROA. It means those firms increase their financial 
performance which complies with the CG practices 
in true spirit. In Model 2, the VIF also reveals the 
absence of multi-collinearity among variables. The 
VIF of CGI score is 1.161 which rejects the existence 
of multi-collinearity. In addition, the R2 has 
increased to 0.43; it means 43% variation in ROA is 
explained by these explanatory variables. The p- and 
t-statistics of the CGI score also show that CGI score 
has a significant positive relationship with ROA. 
 
Table 13. Results of hierarchical multiple regression and collinearity stats for CGI score and ROA 
 
  Model 1 Collinearity stats Model 2 Collinearity stats 
Variables B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta t Tolerance VIF B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta t Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.041 0.036 
 
1.127 
  
-0.440 0.069 
 
-6.338 
  
Age 0.015 0.011 0.223 1.404 0.364 2.751 0.005 0.009 0.074 0.575 0.355 2.817 
Position -0.004 0.007 -0.054 -0.534 0.903 1.108 0.004 0.006 0.057 0.700 0.874 1.144 
Qualification 0.005 0.008 0.068 0.660 0.857 1.166 0.004 0.006 0.047 0.567 0.856 1.168 
Specialization 0.014** 0.007 0.217 2.062 0.831 1.203 0.007 0.006 0.113 1.331 0.810 1.235 
Experience -0.024* 0.014 -0.266 -1.707 0.378 2.648 -0.001 0.012 -0.010 -0.080 0.352 2.842 
CGI Score 
      
0.003*** 0.000 0.627 7.631 0.861 1.161 
R 0.303 
     
0.6560 
     
R2 0.092 
     
0.4300 
     
Adjusted R2 0.046 
     
0.3960 
     
S. error of the 
estimate 
0.066392 
     
0.052852 
     
F 2.008 
     
12.3440 
     
Sum of 
square total 
0.481 
     
0.4810 
     
Df  (5, 99) 
     
(6, 98) 
     
Dependent variable: ROA 
Note: *, **, *** correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), 0.05 level (2-tailed) and 0.01 level (2-tailed), respectively. 
 
4.6. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis of ROE 
 
The results of hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis are presented in Table 14. There is a total of 
two models. In Model 1, only the effect of 
demographic factors such as age, position, 
qualification, specialization, and experience are 
measured on ROE. In addition to multiple 
hierarchical regression, the collinearity tests are also 
conducted. In Model 1, it can be seen that all the 
demographic factors have a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of greater than 1 and mean there is no multi-
collinearity among variables. Model 1 shows the R2 
value of 0.065, it means 6.5% variance in the 
dependent variable (ROE) is explained by these 
demographic variables.  
In Model 2, the CGI score is also added to 
investigate its impact on ROE. The Model 2 reveals 
that the CGI score has a significant positive impact 
on ROE. It means those firms perform better which 
complies with the CG practices in a true spirit. In 
Model 2, the VIF also reveals the absence of multi-
collinearity among variables. The VIF of CGI score is 
1.161 which rejects the existence of multi-
collinearity. In addition, the R2 has increased to 
0.225 which means a 22.5% variation in ROE is 
explained by these explanatory variables. The p- and 
t-statistics of the CGI score also reveal a significant 
positive relationship between the CGI score and ROE. 
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Table 14. Results of hierarchical multiple regression and collinearity statistics for CGI score and ROE 
 
  Model 1 Collinearity stats Model 2 Collinearity stats 
Variables B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta t Tolerance VIF B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta t Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.069 0.098 
 
0.702 
  
-0.803 0.214 
 
-3.760 
  
Age 0.038 0.030 0.209 1.298 0.364 2.751 0.020 0.027 0.107 0.714 0.355 2.817 
Position -0.003 0.020 -0.017 -0.171 0.903 1.108 0.012 0.019 0.059 0.617 0.874 1.144 
Qualification 0.026 0.021 0.125 1.193 0.857 1.166 0.023 0.020 0.110 1.148 0.856 1.168 
Specialization 0.021 0.019 0.121 1.135 0.831 1.203 0.009 0.017 0.050 0.502 0.810 1.235 
Experience -0.069 0.038 -0.291 -1.842 0.378 2.648 -0.027 0.036 -0.116 -0.771 0.352 2.842 
CGI Score 
      
0.005*** 0.001 0.431 4.493 0.861 1.161 
R 0.256 
     
0.474 
     
R2 0.065 
     
0.225 
     
Adjusted R2 0.018 
     
0.178000 
     
Std. error of 
the estimate 
0.177906 
     
0.162824 
     
F 1.386 
     
4.744 
     
Sum of 
square total 
3.353 
     
3.535 
     
Df  (5, 99) 
     
(6, 98) 
     
Dependent variable: ROE          
Note: * correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), ** correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *** correlation 
is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
4.7. Discussion 
 
This section aims to achieve the remaining three 
research objectives of this study. First, the study 
identifies the more influential barriers to good CG 
practices in Pakistan. To achieve this, the study used 
EFA on all 17 barriers and identified five major 
barriers i.e. firm-level barriers (lack of auditor 
independence, board ineffectiveness, lack of 
shareholders‟ awareness), external barriers (political 
and governmental interference in business activities, 
weak legal control and enforcement, high level of 
corruption), social barriers (strong social ties among 
different stakeholders, interpersonal connections 
among BoDs), education and training barriers (lack 
of professional education and training among 
stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer voting rights). 
These five barriers are the most important barriers 
which are affecting the implementation of good CG 
practices in Pakistan. The results are well supported 
by previous studies (Kaur & Mishra, 2010; Wanyama, 
Burton, & Helliar, 2009). 
Regarding the first factor (firm-level barriers), 
the study finds that from the CG implementation 
viewpoint, auditors‟ independence is compromised 
in Pakistan. In addition, the BoDs have failed to be 
effective and shareholders‟ awareness acts as a 
barrier to implementation of good corporate 
governance practices in Pakistan. These findings are 
well supported by Capaul (2003) who argued that 
auditing is a major area of weakness in corporate 
governance enforcement in most transition and 
developing countries which have also failed to 
enforce their laws, rules, and regulation consistently. 
Auditors‟ independence is compromised, and they 
have been giving unqualified opinions, certifying 
that the accounts audited provide a true and fair 
picture despite the many defects noted. 
Regarding the second factor (external barriers), 
the study finds political and governmental influence 
in firms and weak legal control and enforcement of 
regulatory bodies. In addition, the study also finds 
that the level of corruption is another major factor 
that hinders good corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) argued 
that the political system of a country can have 
implications for corporate governance. The findings 
of the study reveal that weak legal control and 
enforcement are barriers for implementing good CG 
practices in Pakistan, while researchers documented 
that enforcement is vital for providing good CG 
system and an effective business environment in 
developing countries like Pakistan (Berglöf & 
Claessens, 2006). Similarly, Wilson (2007) and (Lin & 
Liu, 2009) documented that firms can be estranged 
from the corruption that prevails in the society if 
they are operating in a weakened corporate 
governance environment like Pakistan. Regarding the 
third factor (social barriers), the study finds that 
strong social ties and also interpersonal connections 
among BoDs, also hinder good corporate governance 
practices in Pakistan. Similarly, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) found that social factors such as culture 
affect CG practices in emerging countries. Regarding 
the fourth factor (education and training barrier), 
the study finds that stakeholders lack professional 
education and training. In a similar vein, Okpara 
(2011) documented that lack of required education 
and training is a barrier that hampers the 
development and implementation of corporate 
governance practices in Pakistan. Regarding the fifth 
factor (legal barriers), this study finds that 
shareholders have fewer voting rights, consequently, 
this acts as a barrier in the implementation of CG 
practices in Pakistan. Due to limited voting rights, 
the protection of shareholders‟ rights is also absent 
in Pakistan. In a similar vein, Okpara (2011) 
documented that shareholders‟ rights are very 
crucial and vary from country to country. In 
addition, Jiraporn and Davidson (2009) argued that 
shareholders‟ rights are an important part of 
corporate governance and play a pivotal role in 
controlling the behaviour of BoDs. Kirkbride, Letza, 
and Smallman (2009) argued that there is a need to 
provide effective protection in law to disgruntled 
minority shareholders.  
To fulfill the second objective, the study 
identifies the most influential drivers of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. To 
achieve this, the study used EFA on all 12 drivers 
and identified four major drivers i.e. internal drivers 
(auditors‟ independence, board heterogeneity, board 
independence, initiation of training and educational 
programs to raise awareness), regulatory drivers 
(enhancing and empowering professional regulatory 
bodies), motivational drivers (encouraging 
participation in events and conferences related to 
corporate governance) and collaborative drivers 
(enhancing partnership with international bodies). 
These four drivers are the most important drivers to 
promote good corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. 
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Regarding the first factor (internal drivers), the 
study finds that auditor independence, board 
heterogeneity and independence and initiation of 
training and educational programs can promote 
good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies 
(Al‐Mudhaki & Joshi, 2004). Similarly, Turley and 
Zaman (2004) documented that auditor 
independence has the potential to alleviate 
weaknesses in existing corporate governance 
structures especially in emerging countries. In 
addition, the researchers also argued that board 
heterogeneity promotes relationships and 
networking (Cox & Blake, 1991), enhances corporate 
leadership and increases firm performance (Carter, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Nguyen & Faff, 2007). 
Odle (2007) also argued that better corporate 
governance begins from board diversity. Researchers 
also documented that board independence promotes 
corporate governance practices in firms (MacAvoy & 
Millstein, 2003). Regarding Factor 2 (regulatory 
drivers), the study finds that empowering the 
regulatory and professional bodies can promote 
good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. 
Kajola (2008) argued that the corporate governance 
system will continue to experience challenges due to 
the absence of empowerment of regulators. Hence, it 
is pivotal to empower regulators to promote good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. 
Regarding Factor 3 (motivational drivers), the study 
finds that there is a need to motivate stakeholders 
to participate in events related to corporate 
governance to raise awareness of and willingness to 
adopt practices in the true sense. In Pakistan, 
corporate governance compliance is not in a true 
sense (Khan, 2014) and it is necessary to conduct CG 
related events in order to promote CG practices 
(Samza, 2016). Regarding Factor 4 (collaborative 
drivers), the study finds that there is need to 
collaborate with international bodies such as IFC, 
OECD to promote CG practices in Pakistan. Khan 
(2014) and Samza (2016) also recommended 
collaboration with international bodies to promote 
CG practices in Pakistan. Third and the last, the 
study examines the nexus between CG practices 
(measure from CGI score) and firm performance 
(measure from ROA and ROE). To achieve this 
objective, the study used a five-point Likert scale 
questionnaire to measure the CGI score and 
employed multiple hierarchical regression analysis. 
The findings of multiple hierarchical regression 
analysis revealed that the CGI score has a significant 
positive relationship with both ROA and ROE. Hence, 
CG practices can increase the firm‟s performance 
among listed firms in Pakistan. These findings are 
supported by existing empirical studies (Afza & 
Nazir, 2012; Javid & Iqbal, 2008; Tariq & Abbas, 
2013). 
 
4.8. Integration of qualitative and quantitative 
findings 
 
This section integrates the qualitative and 
quantitative findings and presents the proposed 
model of good CG practices in Pakistan (Figure 3). 
Drawing on qualitative analysis, the study first 
explored the eight key institutional determinants of 
good CG practices in Pakistan such as auditing, 
political, legal, the board, shareholders‟ awareness, 
voting, institutional culture and values and these 
were divided into formal and informal institutions. 
These are the key institutional determinants of good 
CG practices in Pakistan. Researchers have argued 
that certain prerequisite casual conditions need to 
be established and clarified for effective 
implementation and functioning of CG practices 
such as the role of government in the introduction 
of CG reforms and providing an enabling business 
environment (Goergen, 2012). In addition, it is 
fundamental to ascertain a suitable legal and 
institutional foundation to ensure an efficient 
corporate governance system (OECD, 2004). Based 
on these identified institutional determinants, this 
study developed a survey questionnaire and found 
the five most influential barriers to good CG 
practices in Pakistan. These barriers were firm-level 
barriers (lack of auditor independence, board 
ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders‟ awareness), 
external barriers (political and governmental 
interference in business activities, weak legal control 
and enforcement, high levels of corruption), social 
barriers (strong social ties among different 
stakeholders, interpersonal connections among 
BoDs), education and training barriers (lack of 
professional education and training among 
stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer voting rights). 
The barriers hinder good CG practices in 
Pakistan and influence the effectiveness of CG 
reforms and disturb the enabling business 
environment. Existing literature also provides 
evidence that ineffective BoDs (Okpara, 2011), a 
weak regulatory system and enforcement 
(Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003), corruption 
(Adegbite, 2012, 2015), political influence (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Amao, 2012; Okpara, 2011) weak 
monitoring (Adegbite, 2015), ineffective auditing 
practices (Kachelmeier, Rasmussen, & Schmidt, 
2016), and interlocking relationships (McGee & Bose, 
2009; Mensah, Aboagye, Addo, & Buatsi, 2003) are 
major challenges hindering effective implementation 
of CG practices in developing countries such as 
Pakistan. However, researchers‟ marked the role of 
government in CG development by providing an 
enabling business environment and introducing CG 
reforms (Adelman, 2003; Goergen, 2012). 
Drawing on qualitative and quantitative 
findings, the study also finds four major drivers of 
good CG practices in Pakistan through the survey 
questionnaire such as, i.e. internal drivers (auditors‟ 
independence, board heterogeneity, board 
independence, initiation of training and educational 
programs to raise awareness), regulatory drivers 
(enhancing and empowering professional regulatory 
bodies), motivational drivers (encouraging 
participation in events and conferences related to 
corporate governance) and collaborative drivers 
(enhancing partnership with international bodies). 
These drivers can improve good CG practices in 
Pakistan. Enriques and Volpin (2007) also argued 
that some drivers can propel the CG practices in the 
presence of some fundamentals, to attain desired 
expectations such as shareholder activism (Appel, 
Gormley, & Keim, 2016; Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 
2017; Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, 2016), board 
independence (Adegbite et al., 2013; Terjesen, 
Couto, & Francisco, 2016), investor protection (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002), 
information disclosure (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012), 
auditor independence (Francis, 2004), shareholders‟ 
engagement (Filatotchev, Jackson, Gospel, & Allcock, 
2007) and collaboration with international 
regulatory bodies (OECD, 2004). 
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Figure 3. Proposed model for good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
 
 
Note: Developed by researcher 
 
Finally, the study examines the nexus 
between CG compliance and firm performance on a 
sample of PSX listed firms and found a significant 
positive relationship between CG practices, 
measured by a five-point Likert scale CG compliance 
index, and performance, measured by ROA and ROE. 
These findings are also consistent with studies of 
(Afza & Nazir, 2012; Javid & Iqbal, 2008; Tariq & 
Abbas, 2013).  
 
4.9. Proposed model of good CG practices in Pakistan 
 
This study proposed a model for good CG practices 
in Pakistan (see Figure 3) which aims to promote 
good CG practices in Pakistan. The study highlights 
and identifies the formal and informal key 
institutional determinants which shape the CG 
practices in Pakistan.  This study also emphasized 
the role of government to do CG reforms and 
provide enabling business environment. However, 
there are different barriers such as firm-level 
barriers (lack of auditor independence, board 
ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders awareness), 
external barriers (political and governmental 
interference in business activities, weak legal control 
and enforcement, high level of corruption), social 
barriers (strong social ties among different 
stakeholders, interpersonal connections among 
BoDs), education and training barriers (lack of 
professional education and training among 
stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer voting rights) 
that restrain  the effectiveness of CG reforms and 
compliance in Pakistan. GOP and regulatory bodies 
(SECP, PICG) need to take appropriate measures to 
control these barriers in upcoming CG reforms and 
codes. The findings of study reveal that auditing 
process is not effective in Pakistan, hence, 
government needs to make strict criteria regarding 
appointment of internal and external auditors. In 
Pakistan, CCG 2012 required at least one 
independent director while it is increased to two 
independent directors in new CCG 2017. The 
problem is not about numbers, it is about true and 
fair compliance of CG code. It is proposed that SECP 
and PICG need to set a strict criterion regarding 
appointment of independent directors and it should 
be mandatory for firms to take approval from SECP 
before appointment of independent directors. It is 
proposed that SECP and PICG should launch 
awareness programs and highlight potential benefits 
of CG compliance. Political interference is quite 
common among business organizations in Pakistan; 
hence, politics should be separated from business 
and this can only be done through enforcement. 
Corruption is another severe problem that exists in 
Pakistan. The government needs to make reforms to 
tackle corruption in the country and strict action is 
proposed against those who involved in it. Social 
barriers are another big challenge in corporate 
sector of Pakistan. Appointments are made on the 
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basis of social ties and personal relationships. 
Hence, it is proposed that regulatory bodies need to 
set strict criteria for key appointments within firms. 
Shareholders also have fewer voting rights that limit 
their power to control the firm. GOP needs to 
develop a policy regarding protection of voting 
rights of shareholders, especially in family-owned 
businesses.  
The study also identified some drivers such as 
internal drivers (auditors‟ independence, board 
heterogeneity, board independence, initiation of 
training and educational programs to raise 
awareness), regulatory drivers (enhancing and 
empowering professional regulatory bodies), 
motivational drivers (encouraging participation in 
events and conferences related to corporate 
governance) and collaborative drivers (enhancing 
partnership with international bodies) that can 
promote implement and compliance of CG practices 
in Pakistan. It is proposed that GOP should make a 
separate independent regulatory body that ensures 
the independence of auditors and BoDs. GOP can 
also provide subsidies for those firms that comply 
with the CG practices in true spirit and punish the 
others. In addition, it is necessary to enhance the 
power of existing regulatory bodies (i.e. SECP, PICG, 
PSX, etc.) to ensure true CG compliance. It is also 
proposed that there is need to take initiatives to 
motivate shareholders to take part in CG related 
events. For this, SECP and PICG can organize events 
in major cities of Pakistan and encourage 
shareholders to participate either physically or 
online through video conference. It is also observed 
that SECP and PICG have launched directors training 
program (DTP) to train the directors which became 
mandatory in CCG 2017. The cost of DTP is too 
much which may hinder directors of small 
companies to get training certificates. Therefore, it is 
proposed that cost should be reduced and 
subsidized for such programs. In addition, GOP may 
motivate firms for CG compliance by giving them 
some tax rebates. The study also proposed that 
there is need to increase collaboration with 
international regulatory bodies such as OECD, IFC, 
etc. to implement effective CG system in Pakistan. 
GOP may fund and send some candidates to get 
training from these international regulatory bodies 
and these candidates can offer their services to 
firms at low cost. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
The study highlights the pros of robust CG systems 
in Pakistan; however, the attainment of these pros 
can be compromised by various institutional 
determinants. Drawing on institutional and agency 
theories, this study pursues comprehending how CG 
can be regulated and reformed to improve good CG 
practices in Pakistan? The study finds eight 
aggregate institutional determinants of good 
corporate governance practices i.e. political, legal, 
culture, values, shareholders‟ awareness, voting, 
auditing and board in Pakistan. The study finds that 
political invulnerability and political influence are 
affecting the true practices of corporate governance 
in Pakistan. In addition, the study highlights that 
good CG practices are also affected due to high 
levels of corruption within the country. It is 
noteworthy that political invulnerability advances 
the latitude of existing knowledge; however, it has 
not attracted much attention particularly in 
emerging countries. The study finds that PSX listed 
firms lack true spirit CG compliance. Most firms are 
unaware of the benefits of CG practices and also do 
not have enough resources. Due to political 
influence and corruption, the enforcement is not 
there. The regulatory measures pointed at 
concentrating on Pakistan‟s corporate governance 
problems must be institutionally based. Similarly, it 
is necessary to gear the efforts of enforcing 
compliance in developing countries, especially 
Pakistan, with reforms and introducing new 
regulations (Okike, 2007). The study finds that the 
culture, particularly institutional culture has a 
critical effect on corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. Discussions have revealed that the culture 
of Pakistani society has negatively influenced the 
quality, direction, and practice of corporate 
governance. In addition, there is no protection for 
organizational whistle-blowers; hence, CG related 
problems are not detected at an early stage. The 
study also finds that family systems and 
interpersonal connections have great importance 
and affect corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. In addition, the appointments are made on 
personal and family connections rather than merit, 
consequently, firms lack transparency. The study 
also finds that BoDs are not independent and 
diverse, and interlocking exists between BoDs. The 
auditors lack independence and audit committees 
are not composed of independent directors. Hence, 
the authenticity and creditability of auditing are 
questionable. The institutional determinants 
acknowledged in this study have been significantly 
neglected in CG codes in Pakistan; therefore, it can 
be argued that the CG codes in Pakistan are 
unfamiliar to the obligatory business demands. 
Researchers documented that sometimes political 
and social forces surpass economics forces in 
shaping corporate destiny (Warren, 2003) and CG 
practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 
2008). The findings also reveal that the legal 
infrastructure and regulatory instruments are 
present in Pakistan to successfully promote good 
corporate governance, but that compliance and 
enforcement related issues remain the key 
impediment. 
In addition to qualitative analysis, the study 
also employed quantitative analysis to identify the 
most influential barriers and drivers of good 
corporate governance practice in Pakistan and 
examined the nexus between CG compliance and 
firm performance among PSX listed firms. The study 
identified five major barriers i.e. firm-level barriers, 
external barriers, social barriers, education and 
training barriers, and legal barriers. These five 
barriers are the most important barriers which are 
affecting and hindering the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Patel 
(2006) argued that there should be an effective 
system of checks and balances on boards and 
managerial behaviour to promote a good CG system 
in emerging countries. Regarding drivers of good CG 
practices in Pakistan, the study identified four key 
drivers, i.e. internal drivers, regulatory drivers, 
motivational drivers, and collaborative drivers. The 
findings of multiple hierarchical regression analysis 
reveal that CGI score has a significant positive 
relationship with both ROA and ROE. Hence, CG 
practices can increase the firm‟s performance among 
the listed firms in Pakistan. In the end, this study 
proposed a model for good CG practices in Pakistan 
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that identifies institutional determinants and the 
most influential barriers of CG practices which 
restrain the effectiveness of CG reforms and hinder 
the CG reforms and enabling business environment 
in Pakistan. The model also identifies the most 
important drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan 
which can increase CG compliance and ultimately 
increase firm performance.  
We argued that corporate governance practices 
are governed by institutions and appear out of 
nothing. In modern organizations across different 
countries, the expression and format of governance 
are reflections of their institutional environment. 
Two classes of institutions (formal and informal) 
and their associations with CG in the context of 
Pakistan have been analysed. Most prominently, 
these institutions are inter-reliant, interact with and 
affect each other. Consequently, in theorizing on CG 
in emerging countries, especially Pakistan, it is 
imperative to mention that the overall nature of the 
country‟s institutional environments is not 
harmonized with good CG principles, both at the 
firm and national levels. Institutions matter in 
reshaping corporate governance in Pakistan; 
however, Pakistan has not achieved required level of 
CG compliance despite enormous efforts. It can be 
due to lack of interests from firms or lack of 
enforcement in real sense. Evidence reveals that 
institutional environment still matters and 
persuades firms despite globalization. Therefore, CG 
models cannot be treated and comprehended in 
isolation from institutional reinforcements (Guillen, 
1999). Actually, CG cannot be formulated in 
seclusion but exposes the fundamental institutions 
which influence the firm structures, responsibilities, 
and rights of directors and managers and structure 
these are systematized in distinct nations. 
Although the research has some limitations 
and suggests areas for future research. This is a 
Pakistan case study. Due to the sensitivity of CG 
issues, participants were not drawn from all sectors 
of the Pakistan economy. Some participants were 
afraid to talk on this sensitive issue and have not 
given their consent to record their interviews. 
Although, the principles of corporate governance are 
applicable to all listed firms of Pakistan, however, is 
challenging to obtain data from the whole 
population (most of PSX listed were not interested to 
participate in the study). Nevertheless, whilst the 
findings of this study are not easily generalizable, 
given its contextual dimension, it nevertheless offers 
significant analytic generalizability (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011; Yin, 2009). In this study, the research 
has also employed a qualitative mixed-method 
approach for data collection and analysis. Future 
studies may employ alternative methodologies to 
further validate or challenge its findings. The study 
has drawn the sample from PSX listed firms through 
a survey questionnaire and future research may be 
conducted on listed vs non-listed firms of PSX. In 
addition, there is also opportunity to draw a sample 
from SMEs and SOEs. In addition, there is also 
opportunity to draw a sample from small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). In Pakistan, the studies related to 
CG are somewhat scant and have neglected the SEOs, 
hence, it provides an opportunity to conduct further 
studies to evaluate the dynamics of CG in SOEs. 
Finally, as suggested by Steger and Hartz (2005), it is 
imperative to make some further efforts to explore 
corporate governance from economic and 
sociological theories which may add to existing 
knowledge. 
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